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The Islamic Hospital in Amman is the
jewel in the Islamic Centre Charity So-
ciety’s crown. It is an important symbol
of the viability of the Islamist model for
the Muslim Brotherhood that estab-
lished it. In keeping with its stated phil-
anthropic aims, the prices listed at the
hospital are significantly lower than at
other hospitals. The cost of a natural
childbirth delivery is only 15 Jordanian
Dinars (JD) compared to 18 JD at the al-
Bashir Hospital, a public hospital for
the poor, and over 200 JD at the Farah
Hospital, considered the finest private
hospital in Jordan. Furthermore, the
hospital’s Fund for the Sick and Poor provides subsidies for medical
treatments; in 2002 alone it distributed a remarkable 4.5 million JD.1
These statistics appear to support the widely held image of Islamic
charitable and social welfare associations as targeting the poor with
the aim of recruiting them. The authenticity of this image of philan-
thropy combined with recruitment of the poor has largely gone un-
questioned. 
Due to their operational and instrumental dictates, Islamic associa-
tions are largely run by and for the middle class and not the poor. Is-
lamic associations’ services are driven by the associations' needs for
donations and professionals, the demands of the professional middle
class for employment, good schools and hospitals, and the response of
the Brotherhood to its predominantly middle-class constituency. As a
result, they forge strong middle-class networks. Rather than the re-
cruitment of the poor, the activities of such associations directly and
indirectly contribute to the expansion and strengthening of middle-
class ties of solidarity that reinforce an Islamist worldview and bind Is-
lamists, non-Islamists, and the institutions of the Islamist movement.
Islamic associations and the middle-classes
The ICCS, and particularly the Islamic Hospital, is a case in point. The
Brotherhood in Jordan is largely a professional middle-class phenome-
non.2 This is reflected in the ICCS’ services. Of the ICCS’ forty kinder-
gartens and schools, one college, two hospitals, thirty-two medical
clinics, six training centres, and thirty-three centres for orphans and
poor families, its largest facilities –the kindergartens, schools, college,
and hospitals—are all not-for-profit enterprises that are commercial-
like in that they target a paying middle-class clientele and not the poor. 
A second look at the Islamic Hospital’s prices reveals its middle-class
bias. While the base cost of a delivery is 15 JD, the hospital charges sep-
arately for each additional service and tacks on the costs to the original
base fee. The result is that the delivery of one child with no complica-
tions, and with one overnight stay in a third-class room actually costs
190 JD. Patients without medical insurance are charged an extra 20%
of the costs. The hospital’s Fund for the Sick and Poor subsidizes up to
20% of the costs for poor patients thereby reducing the cost of a deliv-
ery to 152 JD. Jordan’s poor, however, spend 15.88 JD or less per year
on medical expenses.3 The hospital is simply beyond their means. And
the same can be said for the ICCS’ private kindergartens, schools and
college.
The ICCS not only targets a middle-class constituency as its clientele,
but for employment purposes as well. The Islamic Hospital alone has
approximately 12,000 employees, seventy-seven resident doctors,
twenty-one interns, and 445 nurses.4 The ICCS employs thousands of
people—mainly professionals who are attracted by handsome pay, full
benefits, and excellent equipment. Furthermore, hiring for the ICCS’
private enterprises is prioritized over hiring for those facilities meant
for the poor. While approximately 200
doctors (including residents and in-
terns, but not part-time doctors) cater
to the needs of the hospital’s middle-
class clientele, only thirty-two doctors
in total tend to the poor in the ICCS’
medical clinics. Three of these clinics,
moreover, are located in the ICCS’ pri-
vate schools.
It is not surprising that ICCS centres
are predominantly situated in the mid-
dle-class neighbourhoods of Amman
and Zarqa. Here the ICCS finds middle-
class clients, employees, and also
donors. The very fabric of the ICCS is
made up of the ongoing development and maintenance of middle-
class social networks—interpersonal ties that are constantly being cre-
ated and/or solidified in order to secure the donations and staff the as-
sociation requires. ICCS directors make individual appeals for dona-
tions of money, services or items to neighbours, friends, colleagues,
and merchants. In this manner, overlapping networks between the
home, mosque, workplace, and other associations make the ICCS pos-
sible. These networks include individuals who may only donate once
per year, those looking for an extra income, those wanting to fulfil a
personal Muslim obligation, and more committed Islamists.
My research found that donating to, volunteering, and working in Is-
lamic associations gradually creates middle-class networks of team-
work, trust, and solidarity. These are reinforced by the benefits the
middle-class receives—jobs, educational and health services, a sense
of purpose, and friendships. Furthermore, by bringing different social
networks together in the provision of charity, Islamic associations cre-
ate new social networks and introduce Islamist networks and world-
views to non-Islamists. 
Do Islamic associations recruit the middle-class? The provision of
health care does not directly lead to recruitment. Rather the creation
and strengthening of intricate social networks indirectly binds their
middle-class members ever closer to Islamist movements. The ques-
tion to be asked is whether this focus on the middle class has alienated
others. 
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To what extent are Islamic associations
vehicles for recruitment for Islamist
movements? Whom do they recruit? How does
recruitment occur? Does the mere provision of
health care suffice as a basis for recruitment?
Can we assume that all those who work and
volunteer in Islamic associations are Islamists
with a political agenda? These represent some
of the questions that motivated research in
Jordan in 1998 to examine the political
significance of the Islamic Centre Charity
Society (ICCS) as part of a larger comparative
study of Islamic associations in Jordan,
Yemen, and Egypt. 
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